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 ‘The glorious uncertainty of the law’: life at the bar, 1810-1830 
 
Michael Lobban 
 
The history of the Georgian legal profession has attracted much attention in recent years.1 
Scholars have become increasingly interested in the education of the legal profession, the 
earning capacity and career structures of practising barristers, the social organisation of the 
bar, and the wider cultural life of the profession. In reconstructing legal lives, historians have 
drawn not only on the records of the bar, but also on biographies, memoirs, diaries and 
correspondence, which are invaluable in offering insights into the daily practice of men at the 
bar, and in tracing the waxing and waning of careers. They are replete with information about 
the education of lawyers – in the offices of special pleaders or equity draftsmen – as well as 
often being rich in gossip about fellow barristers or judges.2 If social and cultural historians 
have made much use of barristers’ diaries and memoirs, however, legal historians, more 
interested in forensic argument and the operation of the courts, have shown less interest in 
these sources. In what follows, it will be suggested that unpublished diaries can also offer us 
significant insights into the nature of daily practice, shedding light on the nature of the 
workings of the common law.  
 
Our focus will be on the diaries of two barristers at work in the 1810s and 1820s, who had 
very different career trajectories. Born in 1775 in Bury St Edmunds, Henry Crabb Robinson 
initially intended to qualify as an attorney, but gave up the law in 1797 when an inheritance 
allowed him to follow his literary and philosophical interests. He returned to the law in 
November 1809, when he was admitted to the Middle Temple, and received his call in May 
1813. He continued to practice as a barrister for fifteen years, before giving up the law once 
more in 1828. Robinson’s great cultural legacy was his diary, selections from which were 
published in three volumes in 1869, two years after his death. His diaries are also a treasure 
trove for legal historians, for he describes life at the bar in the 1810s and 1820s in greater 
detail than any other contemporary diarist.3 John Taylor Coleridge, nephew of the poet, was 
another keen lawyer diarist.4 Although fifteen years younger than Robinson, their early 
                                                          
1
 See especially David Lemmings, Professors of the Law: Barristers and English Legal 
Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 2000), Raymond Cocks, Foundations of the 
Modern Bar (London, 1983), and P. Polden, ‘Barristers’, in W. Cornish et al., The Oxford 
History of the Laws of England, vol. XI: 1820-1914 (Oxford, 2010), 1067-82. 
2
 E.g. [Mrs Hardcastle], Life of John Campbell, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, 2 
vols. (London, 1881), P. C. Scarlett, A Memoir of the Right Honourable James, First Lord 
Abinger (London, 1877), Memoirs of the Life of Sir Samuel Romilly, Written by Himself 
(London, 1840), and H. Twiss, The Public and Private Life of Lord Chancellor Eldon 
(London, 1844). 
3
 There are thirty-three volumes of his diaries held in Dr. Williams’s Library, Gordon Square, 
London. The Henry Crabb Robinson Project, led by Timothy Whelan and James Vigus, is 
engaged in producing an edition of the entire diary: see www.crabbrobinson.co.uk/.  For 
earlier published extracts, see Thomas Sadler, Diary, Reminiscences and Correspondence of 
Henry Crabb Robinson, 3 vols. (London, 1869), and Derek Hudson, The Diary of Henry 
Crabb Robinson: An Abridgement (London, 1967). 
4
 Thirty-four notebooks of the journal which he kept from 1814 to the end of his life in 1876 
are in the British Library (BL): MSS Add. 86027-60. In what follows, the folios are cited 
careers at the bar overlapped, for John was also a barrister of the Middle Temple, called in 
1819. Coleridge’s career was in many ways different from Robinson’s: whereas the dissenter 
was barred from study at the universities, the Anglican Coleridge had a glittering career at 
Oxford, where he became a close friend of John Keble and Thomas Arnold. Where the young 
Robinson had supported the principles of the French Revolution and was a friend of the 
Radicals, Coleridge was a staunch Tory, who was sceptical about Catholic Emancipation and 
opposed to the 1832 Reform Bill. He was also very keenly devoted to the Anglican church – 
often regretting the fact that his father had forced him to follow a career in the law, rather 
than the church – and spent much more time in his diary considering spiritual and 
ecclesiastical matters than legal ones.5 
 
The barrister’s business 
         
Barristers’ diaries give great insight into daily life at the bar, and the flow of business they 
engaged in. For those lacking metropolitan connections, the lion’s share of their early income 
came from business done at their local Quarter Sessions6 or during the visit of the circuit 
judges to their home towns.7 Success here would pave the way for more clients at other assize 
towns, and eventually in London.8 Barristers had to take the chance of business as and when 
it came. During a lean summer circuit in 1817, Robinson ‘found at my lodgings briefs & 
others came in before dinner which satisfied me that Norwich would supply the deficiencies 
of the other places on the Circuit.’9 Business could come by way of luck, such as the chance 
mention of one’s name to a local attorney, or the fact that the preferred lawyer was absent. 
Barristers might not have much time to prepare. Attorneys would give them briefs at the 
sessions or the assizes, to be studied in lodgings before they came to court. A more 
predictable income could be secured if the barrister received a retainer for a case in 
advance;10 better still if he got a general retainer either from a local attorney or a client (as 
                                                          
according to Coleridge’s original numbering. 
5
 For a life of Coleridge, which draws extensively on these diaries, see Timothy J. Toohey, 
Piety and the Professions: Sir John Coleridge and his Sons (New York, 1987). 
6
 For the importance of sessions to the young barrister, see Lemmings, Professors of the Law, 
154-5. 
7
 Of the £40 19s. Coleridge earned at his first summer assizes, £32 11s. came from Exeter and 
£6 6s. from Bodmin. It was not enough to cover his expenses of £49 9s. 7d. At the following 
Michaelmas sessions in Exeter, his earnings were £43 16s. 6d., and his outgoings £12 15s. 
18½d. BL Add. MS 86063, fos. 5-6. 
8
 Contrast Romilly, Memoirs, vol. I, 72, 92-4; [Hardcastle], Life of Campbell, vol. I, 195, 209; 
Scarlett, Memoir of Abinger, 48-9. 
9
 Robinson Diary, vol. 6, fo. 13 (5 August 1817).  
10
 In February 1826. Coleridge was retained in seventeen causes for the circuit, having never 
had more than five previously: Add. MS 86034, fo. 96. Campbell explained that retainers 
were given ‘[w]hen a man has a cause coming on, [and] he is frightened out of his wits lest 
you should be against him’: [Hardcastle], Life of Campbell, vol. I, 275. 
Coleridge did in 1825, when retained to deal with the king’s interests as Duke of Cornwall).11   
 
Much of the barrister’s life was peripatetic, with long periods away from home, involving (as 
Coleridge put it) a ‘long and tedious journey to scramble and wrangle for a few pounds.’12 
Only when a barrister’s name was very well established could he afford to stop making the 
regular trips to his local Quarter Sessions (as Coleridge did in 1829). Barristers were ever 
keen to cultivate business in London, but this could take time to develop.  In 1825, Coleridge 
complained, ‘I can hardly say that I have anything arriving purely from London 
connection’.13 Two years later, he wrote, ‘every circuit I come as it were a fresh man, for I 
hardly open my mouth between circuit and circuit.’14 It was not the experience of arguing in 
Westminster Hall which put men with London business at an advantage, according to 
Coleridge, but the fact that they were ‘habituated to the regular, admirable nature of London 
Nisi Prius proceedings’.15  
 
When in London, much of the barrister’s time might be spent watching proceedings in court 
or waiting for business to come on. Robinson’s entry for 9 December 1816 is not untypical: ‘I 
read law in the forenoon and I lounged down to Westminster to see the progress of the 
Westminster sittings.’16 He spent a good deal of time watching interesting cases - such as the 
notorious case of Ashford v. Thornton17 – and commenting on the performance of counsel 
and judges.18 In part, this was educational – for he would mull over legal points raised in the 
cases he attended – but it was also a form of entertainment.19 Many visits to court were 
                                                          
11
 BL MS Add. 86034, fo. 195, 23 November 1825.  For other retainers he obtained, see BL 
Add. MSS 86032, fo. 147, 86034, fo. 101, and 86035, fos. 31-32.  
12 BL MS Add. 86032, 12 January 1823, fo. 8. 
13
 BL MS Add. 86034, fo. 112 (22 April 1825). See also Add. MSS 86032, fo. 134 (12 
November 1823) and 86031, fo. 53 (18 June 1822). 
14 BL MS Add. 86035, fo. 50 (12 April 1827). 
15
 BL MS Add. 86036, fos. 36-37 (28 August 1828). 
16
 Robinson Diary, vol. 5, fo. 111. 
17
 Ashford v. Thornton (1818) 1 B & Ald 405. The case has attracted the attention of a 
number of literary scholars: e.g. Gary R. Dyer, ‘“Ivanhoe”, Chivalry and the Murder of Mary 
Ashford’, Criticism 39 (1997), 383-408, and Mark Schoenfield, ‘Ashford v Thornton, 
Ivanhoe and Legal Violence’, Prose Studies, 23 (2000), 61-86. 
18
 He observed that Joseph Chitty had got his pupils to provide the inept translations of 
Bracton, and he had delivered an argument which ‘resembled a building framed of loose 
stones cemented by nothing’: Robinson Diary, vol. 6, fo. 82 (6 February 1818). Cf. 
Campbell’s description of meeting other young barristers in the King’s Bench, where ‘we 
criticise the leaders, quiz the judges, and abuse the profession’: [Hardcastle], Life of 
Campbell, vol. I, 195. 
19
 However, not all cases were interesting: on 31 May 1816, Robinson noted, ‘I spent some 
time at the Old Bailey – I translated while in Court part of [Heinrich] Voss’s Junior’s essay 
on the Clouds of Aristophanes and read for an hour Hobhouse’s letters from France.’ 
occasioned by business to be done. Sometimes, counsel might have to wait for days for a case 
to come on; but at other times, business might come on unexpectedly.20 ‘I went down to 
Westminster Hall to make a Motion and luckily ascertained that my Copyhold Argument was 
to come on tomorrow,’ Robinson wrote on 29 May 1815, ‘This furnished me with occupation 
for the rest of the day.’21 
 
Much of the young barrister’s business in term time was routine. It included attendance in the 
Bail Court, where a single judge dealt with challenges to bail in cases where arrests for debt 
had been made. On several occasions, Robinson was frustrated by having to wait six hours 
here to earn a half-guinea fee.22 Other business included making motions of course, and 
arguing on motions for new trials, arising from cases handled on circuit. In addition, there 
was work to be done in chambers, including the drawing of pleadings or advising solicitors 
on cases.23 A good day might be a very busy one: in February 1815, Robinson described the 
busiest day he had ever had, ‘having justified twice in bail, put in three Motions of course 
And argued in Support of a Motion against E. Alderson.’24 The latter kind of business was the 
best way of making one’s name known in London: the more important the case – and the 
longer the argument – the better. Appearing before the House of Lords or the Privy Council25 
might also enhance one’s reputation. Having one’s name in the law reports was always an 
object of ambition: ‘it is my game to keep up a reputation as a lawyer,’ Coleridge noted in 
1831, ‘and that in some measure depends in the eye of the profession generally in both 
classes, upon filling a prominent part in the reports.’26 
 
The diaries also give us an insight into the variety of business engaged in by rising barristers, 
which might include bankruptcy proceedings, election petitions, parliamentary business, and 
arbitrations. Early in his career, in 1814, Robinson was given a brief by a solicitor, who 
happened to be a fellow debater at the Surrey Institution, to examine a creditor before 
                                                          
Robinson Diary, vol. 5, fo. 56. 
20
 Ibid., vol. 3, fo. 122 (5 February 1814). 
21
 Ibid., vol. 4, fo. 116 (29 May 1815). 
22
 Ibid., vol. 5, fo. 104 (16 November 1816); vol. 6, fo. 44 (15 November 1817). 
23
 E.g. ibid., vol. 3, fo. 134 (12 March 1814): ‘Jameson called with a case on a foreign bill of 
Exch: in which he wanted an immediate Opinion. This worried me as the Case was all 
indigested and not formally drawn up – tho’ the law was simple on the case when 
understood.’ 
24
 Ibid., vol. 4, fo. 68 (3 February 1815).  The case in question was Banks v. Brand (1815) 3 
M & S 525. Compare the description in [Hardcastle], Life of Campbell, vol. I, 194-5. 
25
 In 1818, Robinson appeared (with Romilly) in a Gibraltarian case in the Privy Council - 
Ross v Viale: Robinson Diary, vol. 6, fo. 81 (2 February 1818). 
26
 BL MS Add. 86037, fo. 179, 15 June 1831. Cf. his earlier expression of hope in Add. MS 
86034, fo. 115, 29 April 1825: ‘I may now look forward to finding a place in every number 
of the reports’ 
Commissioners of Bankruptcy meeting in a coffee house.27 In the following year, he acted for 
the first time as a country commissioner in Cambridge, where he was glad to have an 
experienced barrister to guide him in this novel work.28 Coleridge does not seem to have had 
a large bankruptcy practice, but was nonetheless promised a London commissionership in 
1827. He welcomed this opportunity not only for the income and it offered, but also for ‘the 
insight which I shall get into bankruptcy law by it’.29 Bankruptcy business clearly needed a 
lawyer’s forensic skills: proceedings might stall (for instance) if a petitioner seeking to 
establish that a trader had committed an act of bankruptcy in locking his doors earlier than 
usual – a standard charge – failed to prove that his intention in so doing was to deny his 
creditors.30  
 
Election work was also desirable, for reasons of both profit and reputation. Coleridge gained 
much attention in 1826 when he acted in a contested election case at Leominster, where 
Rowland Stephenson challenged the candidacy of the Lottery contractor, Mr Bish. Having 
persuaded the assessor to make a double return and express an opinion in Stephenson’s 
favour, Coleridge’s ‘health was drank with three times three’ in the town.31 The case also 
gave him his first chance to argue at the bar of the House of Commons, where he succeeded, 
gaining thereby both a considerable fee and the attention of new clients.32 Parliamentary 
business could also be highly remunerative. In 1826, Robinson accepted a lucrative brief to 
attend the committee proceedings on a Norwich and Lowestoft Navigation Bill, even though 
he admitted to being ‘ignorant on the subject of the Bill’.33 The experience revealed to him 
the arbitrary nature of proceedings in this forum. The bill was rejected by a majority, after the 
MP for Yarmouth (whose seat was at risk if the bill passed) marshalled a large number of 
members who had never attended any of the hearings to vote against it.34 
 
Barristers also made a useful income from arbitrations, primarily those which were referred 
by a court in which litigation had begun.35 Young barristers were keen to obtain references 
                                                          
27
 Robinson Diary, vol. 3, fo. 161 (20 May 1814). 
28
 Ibid., vol. 4, fo. 83 (13 March 1815). 
29
 BL MS Add. 86035, fos. 72 (11 June 1827) and 156-157 (12 December 1827), and MS 
Add. 86036, fo. 38 (30 August 1828). Cf. his letter to John May: Bodleian Library (Bodl.) 
MS Eng. lett. c. 289, fo. 138 (17 January 1827). 
30
 Robinson Diary, vol. 5, fo. 32 (27 March 1816). 
31
 BL MS Add. 86034, fo. 140 (18 June 1826); see also The Times, 18 June 1826, 1. 
32
 BL MS Add. 86035, fos. 30-31 (19 February 1827). 
33
 Robinson Diary, vol. 12, fos. 17, 28, 30 (3, 8, 10 April 1826). 
34
 Ibid., fo. 38 (2 May 1826). Cf. [Hardcastle], Life of Campbell, vol. I, 204, 227. 
35
 Under the 1698 Arbitration Act, the agreement of parties who had not commenced 
litigation to refer their disputes to arbitration could be enforced by being made a rule of court. 
See further Henry Horwitz and James Oldham, ‘John Locke, Lord Mansfield and Arbitration 
during the Eighteenth Century’, Historical Journal, 36 (1993), 137-59. 
wherever possible. In August 1823, with only two prisoners to defend at Bridgewater, 
Coleridge ‘determined to remain and take the chance of a reference’ coming his way.36 On 
Robinson’s Norfolk circuit, there was much chatter by juniors over ‘the distribution of 
references by the Seniors’, for they worried that preferential treatment was given to some 
when names were to be suggested by senior counsel.37 Arbitrations were financially 
attractive: in the late 1810s,  Robinson received between ten and twenty guineas for an 
arbitration,38 while other counsel (including Coleridge) could command over fifty guineas. 
They could also lead to other work: in 1819 at Aylesbury, Robinson unexpectedly received a 
brief ‘from a London attorney who was the winning party on a reference in which I was an 
arbitrator – a proof of the effect of having references given to barristers’.39 
 
Barristers’ professional lives could be precarious, and diarists were prone to record in some 
detail not only the nature and amount of their earnings, but also their standing relative to 
rivals at the bar.40 Rising young men could always pose a threat to the success of older ones. 
‘The melancholy thing upon the circuit is to see the approaching fate of such really good men 
as Gaselee, Selwyn and Merewether, who are gradually declining and will sink to cyphers 
probably,’ Coleridge observed in 1824, ‘unless they should get elevation to the Bench.’41 
Observing the new appointments in 1827, he observed, ‘Launcelot Shadwell is the new Vice 
[Chancellor]: a lucky fellow; for his business was declining.’42 Robinson, whose own 
business was languishing in the 1820s, particularly after the arrival on the circuit of Fitzroy 
Kelly,43 resolved to leave the bar in 1828. Coleridge worried a good deal about the business 
taken by rivals such as Wilde or Follett, and whether he would be able to maintain his 
position. Ever ambitious to reach the bench, but fearing being overtaken, he noted in 1830, ‘I 
may go downhill so, and lose business & character so much, that it may become more and 
more difficult to place me.’44 
 
                                                          
36
 BL MS Add. 86032, fo. 89 (9 August 1823). In 1820, he was pleased at Bodmin to have 
‘disputes referred to my arbitration, not as a matter of influence and patronage from other 
counsel, but by the selection of attornies before the assizes and without bringing up their 
causes to be tried’. Letter to John May, Bodl. MS Eng. lett. c. 289, fo. 86 (9 August 1820). 
37
 Robinson Diary, vol. 6, fo. 11 (30 July 1817).  
38
 Ibid., vol. 4, fo. 141 (27 July 1815), vol. 6, fo. 146 (19 June 1818). 
39
 Ibid., vol. 7, fo. 38 (5 March 1819). 
40
 Cf. [Hardcastle], Life of Campbell, vol. I, 279. 
41
 He added, ‘It would do well for the country if room were made for them – such a judge as 
Burrough is really a disgrace to us’: Add. MS 86032, fos. 185-186 (13 March 1823). 
42
 BL MS Add. 86035, fo. 125 (27 October 1827). 
43
 ‘Clever as he is,’ Robinson noted of Kelly, ‘he has no qualities that excite admiration.’ 
Robinson Diary, vol. 12, fo. 69 (20 July 1826). 
44
 BL MS Add. 86037, fo. 34 (29 March 1830). For his praise of Follett, see letter to John 
May, Bodl. MS Eng. lett. c. 289, fo. 152 (5 April 1830). 
For lawyers like Robinson and Coleridge, the law was a means of earning a living, rather than 
a passion in itself. In his diaries, Coleridge constantly lamented both his lack of interest in 
law and his lack of talent for it. He found the law thankless and irksome, and worried about 
his ‘own ignorance and want of legal principles.’ When he took ‘a case in hand determined to 
go to the bottom of it, ... my mind wanders, or my powers of attention give in before I have 
got half through it.’45 Although Coleridge’s self-deprecation was no doubt greatly 
exaggerated, his diaries do not reflect a man with a deep intellectual interest in the law. Only 
on the rarest occasions do his diaries mention which legal books he was reading, and then 
without enthusiasm: ‘This very evening I have been in vain puzzling over a passage in 
Fearne, which half the men of the bar would have had no more difficulty in than in reading 
the newspaper,’ he wrote on 22 October 1827, ‘It is very melancholy’.46 
 
Robinson’s diaries are much more informative about his reading. This was not so much 
systematic, as tailored to the immediate needs of his practice. ‘I know not what I can 
profitably read but pro re nata’, he wrote two years after his call, ‘And that is a wretched 
system.’47 On resuming his legal studies in 1811 after an eleven-year-hiatus, he had begun 
with Blackstone’s Commentaries. Although a book in constant demand - and one which 
Coleridge would edit while at the bar – Robinson was immediately unimpressed, finding it 
‘of no practical importance’ and ‘not a book of study’.48 Instead, he took up Samuel 
Marshall’s Treatise on the Law of Insurance,49 which he thought would be more practically 
useful. He supplemented his reading by looking at the article on insurance in William 
Selwyn’s Abridgement of the Law of Nisi Prius (whose ‘selection of topics [was] judicious in 
reference to actual business’)50 and listening to insurance cases in Westminster Hall. He soon 
gave up on Blackstone, though he did read Richard Wooddeson’s lectures after his call, 
commenting that ‘the views it gives of the general system and the connection of the law 
might be useful if I had a practical head to apply them’.51 He also found Coke upon Littleton 
(recommended by his pupil-master) heavy going. He was only able to make progress with it 
by using J.H. Thomas’s 1818 Systematic Arrangement of Lord Coke’s First Institute, which 
‘made this very famous book really useful – It is now possible to preserve some connection 
of thought in reading it’.52 Robinson did read a wide variety of legal works for interest’s sake 
– including the biographies of eighteenth-century judges, and reformist works from William 
                                                          
45
 BL MS Add. 86032, fo. 3 (2 January 1823). 
46
 BL MS Add. 86035, fo. 120. 
47
 Robinson Diary, vol. 4, fo. 188 (16 December 1815). 
48
 Ibid., vol. 1, fo. 24 (6-7 March 1811). 
49
 Ibid., vol. 1, fo. 24 (7 March 1811). The Treatise was first published in 1802; a second 
edition was issued in 1808. 
50
 Ibid., vol. 1, fo. 43 (25 April 1811). The second edition of Selwyn’s work was published in 
1810. 
51
 Ibid., vol. 4, fo. 188 (16 December 1815). Richard Wooddeson’s A Systematical View of 
the Laws of England, based on his Vinerian lectures, was published in three volumes in 1792. 
 
52
 Ibid., vol. 7, fo. 122 (2 September 1819). 
Eden’s Principles of Penal Law to Bentham’s Scotch Reform – but they were not works he 
drew on in his practice. For instance, as a pupil, he read Jones on Bailments on a stage coach 
journey to Bury, Wynne’s Eunomus: Or, Dialogues concerning the Law and Constitution of 
England on a leisurely walk in the fields beyond Islington, and St German’s Doctor and 
Student in bed.  
 
Law reports furnished the bulk of his regular reading. Many mornings were spent making 
notes ‘in my books of reports from the Numbers of Term Reports’ – a ‘tiresome’ if ‘useful’ 
employment.53 He was aware that judges like Sir Vicary Gibbs ‘spoke against the Term 
Reports as very injurious to the young men of the profession by occasioning them to neglect 
note taking’. Gibbs wanted to see lawyers who could argue on principle, and worried about 
the number of cases reported: ‘by the multiplication of these, law is become not a difficult, 
but an unattainable science.’54 Robinson also protested against excessive reporting, 
expressing exasperation at East’s 42-page report of Dr Povah’s case,55 and denouncing 
Chitty’s Reports of Cases, principally on Practice and Pleading as ‘a book absolutely 
disgraceful to have written – the most gross and palpable catch penny work ever published 
under the form of reports’.56 However, while he continued to take notes in court, and to 
collate them with the printed reports, he questioned the utility of his own note taking,57 and 
used the printed ones as the prime source of his day-to-day legal knowledge (while also 
making sure to send reports of significant cases in which he had appeared to the law 
reporters).58  
 
Robinson also made extensive use of digests and dictionaries,59 spending much time collating 
                                                          
53
 Ibid., vol. 5, fo. 172 (29 May 1817). 
54
 Ibid., vol. 6, fo. 145 (16 June 1818). 
55
 R. v. Archbishop of Canterbury (1812) 15 East 117. Robinson Diary, vol. 2, fo. 151 (1 
November 1812): ‘This book-making is one of the Curses of the profession!’  
56
 Ibid., vol. 7, fo. 76 (22 May 1819). Joseph Chitty’s Reports were published in two 
volumes, in 1820 and 1823. 
57
 Ibid., vol. 3, fo. 92 (23 October 1813). On 18 November 1814 (vol. 4, fo. 40), he noted ‘I 
sat up till one copying notes taken in Court, but I believe I shall soon alter my plan & attend 
less to arguments in Court than I have done for I lose a great deal of time there.’ 
58
 Ibid., vol. 7, fo. 3 (7 December 1818), sending ‘two reports today for the Term Reports of 
my case’, referring to Farrer v. Billing (1818) 2 B & Ald 171: ‘These I wrote this morning.’ 
59
 When starting out in his studies, his friend Manning ‘shewed me his MS Law Common-
Place book – it professed to be formed as a continuation of Comyns digest. And the Index 
was made according to the plan laid down by Locke. It appeared to me better to make 
references to the MS notes in Comyns itself, if that book be considered as the fittest index to 
the law. There might be a MS alphabetical Index to the MSS.’ Robinson Diary, vol. 1, fo. 29 
(22 March 1811). Sir John Comyns’s A Digest of the Laws of England was published in five 
volumes between 1762 and 1767. 
materials from these works,60 and indexing the recent numbers of the law reports into them.61 
When it came to legal treatises, most of his professional attention was directed to practical 
works, such as Abbott on Shipping or Bayley on Bills, which he filled up with cases from 
recent case law.62 He also made sure to check the latest editions of practical books.63 With his 
extensive practice at sessions, he found Michael Nolan’s treatise on the poor laws64 ‘more 
directly and instantaneously useful than any professional work I have yet read’, even if it was 
untheoretical.65 By contrast, he was unsure how useful Evans’s edition of Pothier on 
Obligations was: ‘By mingling Opinions however valuable and intimation of the law of 
foreign Countries with our own legal decisions, I am in danger of confounding what ought to 
be with what is.’66 General textbooks were only consulted on the hoof, to help solve a 
particular question he needed to argue, as when in 1816 he ‘looked over Whitmarsh’s 
bankrupt law’ on the way to a hearing.67 
 
Criminal law 
 
Although civil litigation provided the path to both riches and reputation, rising barristers also 
engaged in a significant amount of criminal work, and the diaries offer a valuable insight into 
the strategies used by criminal barristers in this era. They often learned on the job. In 1822, 
Coleridge was glad to take on some criminal cases – ‘an odious business’ – since ‘it is to me 
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 Cf. ibid., vol. 2, fo. 141 (14 January 1813). 
61
 Cf. ibid., vol. 2, fo. 115 (26 July 1812): ‘Spent the forenoon at home, Indexing the last 
numbers of East Rep. into Tomlin’s Digest’, referring to T. E. Tomlins, Repertorium 
juridicum: A general index to all the cases and pleadings in law and equity (London, 1786-
87). 
62
 Charles Abbott, A Treatise of the Law relative to Merchant Ships and Seamen (London, 
1802; and later editions), and John Bayley, A Short Treatise on the Law of Bills of Exchange 
(London, 1789; and later editions). Cf. Robinson Diary, vol. 5, fo. 18 (22 February 1816): ‘I 
spent the forenoon reading Crown Law and putting the recent Statutes into East’s Pleas of the 
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an instructive business, for I know practically far too little of the criminal law.’68 High profile 
criminal cases were also very useful in attracting the notice of attorneys. After successfully 
defending two men charged with murder in 1823 after the ‘Chippenham Riots’ – a brawl 
between men from neighbouring towns – Coleridge noted that ‘this was a case of great 
notoriety and interest, and I believe it is likely to do me a great deal of service.’69 Another 
case which he regarded as important for his career prospects was ‘my great Salisbury case’. 
There were in fact two linked cases: in the one, John Seymour, a gentleman of fortune from 
Ramsbury, was indicted for unnatural offences with a servant (including a capital charge of 
sodomy); in the other, two of Seymour’s other servants – Coleridge’s clients – were indicted 
for a conspiracy to make a false accusation against him. ‘I have almost every thing to gain 
and much to lose according to the manner in which I conduct the trial,’ Coleridge noted, ‘If I 
should do well, I may expect almost any thing for the future in Wilts.’70 Seymour’s case was 
tried at the end of July 1827, when Coleridge sensed that the judge was against him and that 
he had little chance of obtaining a conviction on the capital charge, which rested on the 
testimony of the servants peeping under a door. Under the circumstances, ‘I thought it better 
to reserve my fire, remove the indictment for the misdemeanour by a certiorari which I had 
provided for the event, and keep that as a set off against the indictment for a conspiracy.71 
Seymour was convicted of the misdemeanour at the following assizes, and soon absconded. 
Coleridge’s clients were then formally acquitted of conspiracy (though he admitted privately 
that ‘they may unintentionally have coloured their story’). After the event, he wrote, ‘I cannot 
but rejoice – and it is matter (I hope of honest and allowable) self congratulation to me, that I 
was not found wanting in my arduous task.’72  
 
As the Seymour case illustrates, there were various strategies that defence counsel might use 
to secure victory. In 1823, Coleridge was retained at the last minute at the Exeter sessions to 
defend the Revd John Kingdon Cleeve for an indecent assault, committed one week earlier on 
an eighteen-year-old man. Cleeve had a bad reputation locally, and on the Sunday following 
the event, his congregation deserted their pews when he entered the church. Coleridge’s 
advice to the clergyman (who could not find bail) was to go to trial at once, since it would 
catch out the prosecution and come across as a bold assertion of innocence. At the trial, 
Coleridge sought to use the very local prejudice against Cleeve in his favour with the jury, 
and after seventeen hours of deliberation, the jury acquitted him.73 
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 The diaries show us how, in an era when the adversarial trial bound by rules of evidence had 
become established, lawyers were careful in sifting and testing evidence. Robinson’s first 
major trial came at his first assizes in Norwich in 1813, when he was given a brief in court to 
defend James Maxey, who was to be tried the next day for poisoning his wife and her 
daughter. All the evidence was circumstantial. The women had been poisoned by drinking tea 
from a kettle containing a corrosive substance, a quantity of which had recently gone missing 
from Maxey’s master. The prisoner was on bad terms with his wife, who before her death had 
named her husband as the only person who could have put poison into the kettle. Robinson 
began timidly, fearing that his cross-examination might reveal incriminating information 
unknown to him – ‘for we were in the situation of persons walking in a wood at night with 
reason to believe that spring guns and steal [sic] traps were scattered in all directions’ – but 
he took courage when sensing that Chief Baron Alexander was with him. He drew attention 
to circumstances which might cast a doubt in the jury’s mind, such as the fact that the latch 
on the house door had not been fastened when Maxey left, and that other people had access to 
the poison.  The Chief Baron then told the jury that ‘all the links of the chain must be entire’ 
where the evidence was circumstantial, and summed in the prisoner’s favour. After much 
hesitation – and against the public feeling – Maxey was acquitted.74 
 
If the diaries detail careful forensic examinations, they also reveal blunders. Defending a man 
accused of stealing meat during a riot in 1816, Robinson called a witness who (he had been 
informed) would swear that she had seen the defendant leaving the premises in question 
without the meat. The presiding judge ‘Gibbs called me to him and cautioned me not to 
examine her on such a point, as if the jury did not believe her such a testimony would make 
the fate of the prisoner certain.’ He took the hint and was grateful for this ‘benevolent 
interference.’75 On other occasions, he was less fortunate. In 1820, he defended two young 
men on a case of highway robbery, in which the main evidence came from the victim. During 
the case, he ‘asked very injudicious questions and certainly made a bad defence in a bad 
case’. In particular, ‘I forgot myself so far as to ask whether certain conversations did not 
take place between [the prosecutor] and the boys – which as Blosset [presiding] -  rather 
unkindly towards me observed, was an admission that they were there.  The remark exposed 
my blunder and it was not called for on his part.’76 
 
Robinson was particularly irked when judges admitted evidence that they should have 
rejected. In 1815, he was annoyed when clients were transported for seven years for stealing 
feather beds, in a case where the only evidence against them came from the wife of a 
transported accomplice. He noted that Heath’s sentence was wrong, ‘as far as the want of 
legal evidence renders a conviction bad’, though he admitted that ‘the fellows were clearly 
guilty and notoriously part of a gang of house breakers.’77 In 1816, when three men were 
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convicted of possessing forged notes, after collecting (but not opening) a package which had 
been accidentally opened and resealed in transit, he noted, ‘I was not satisfied with a 
conviction of one man obtained under such evidence, tho’ I had no doubt of the prisoner’s 
guilt.’78 Sometimes he raised his concerns with the judge. In 1828, he protested to Garrow for 
having admitted evidence against his client that his wife had pawned some of the stolen 
goods – ‘It not being proved that the husband and wife were living together!!’ Garrow told 
him that ‘he had thought anxiously on the subject and that ‘no harm should come of it’ 79 
 
Although until 1836 the law stipulated that counsel could not address the jury for the prisoner 
in cases of felony, it was evident that lawyers routinely found ways of doing so. After the 
Maxey trial, Robinson wrote, ‘In my Cross examining I thought I had some portion of the 
talent of Garrow in giving to a question the effect and impression of a little Speech’.80 
Similarly, after an unsuccessful defence of men for uttering   bad silver money in 1816, he 
wrote, ‘I made a short speech to the jury which was more favourably received by the bar than 
anything I had done before.’81 
 
The diaries also reveal how far random factors might shape trial outcomes. Proofs might fail 
because key witnesses had failed to appear, or because the barrister knew ‘so little from the 
brief of the character of the witnesses that I did not dare to cross examine them much.’82 
Juries might be unable to remember the names of individual prisoners, thereby undoing 
careful forensic examinations designed to exonerate particular individuals.83 They might on 
occasion betray ‘a stupidity quite disgraceful to the county and even to the mode of trial so 
much and often so absurdly eulogized.’84 Much might also depend on the character of the 
judge hearing the case. In 1815, Robinson defended Elizabeth Woolterton in a poisoning 
case, before Gibbs CJ. The case rested on circumstantial evidence similar to that in Maxey’s, 
but on this occasion he lost. Reflecting on the two cases, he observed that ‘the verdict would 
have been in both cases different under the other judge.’85 Judges might also be prone to 
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make errors. In one case, Justice Heath became impatient with Robinson’s excessively 
minute examination of witnesses when prosecuting for larceny. Thinking the case clearly 
made out, Heath cut him off and told the jury that if they believed the witnesses, they must 
convict; but against the judge’s expectations, they returned a verdict of not guilty.86  
 
We can also gain an insight into how lawyers reacted to capital punishment from the diaries. 
In 1822, Coleridge reflected on his feelings after hearing the death sentence imposed on a 
man he had prosecuted under Lord Ellenborough’s Act. ‘I can hardly tell how it is that I feel 
so little about it,’ he wrote: ‘at the time one’s feelings are naturally much swallowed up both 
by the necessity of attention to your case, and the anxiety to make it out and succeed – then 
when it comes to the sentence, you are generally warm from the struggle of the trial, and 
much impressed with the wickedness of the party’.87 When he had become a judge, and had 
to impose the death sentence, Coleridge found it rather more troubling, with many entries 
describing his distress at imposing the sentence.88 
 
Civil litigation 
 
The diaries give a good insight into the nature of the civil business which barristers engaged 
in and into their litigation strategies. Much of the lucrative work at sessions was made up of 
Poor Law appeals, which generally centred on rival parishes disputing about where particular 
paupers were settled. Such cases could lead to absurd conflicts: Robinson observed a case 
brought at the Middlesex Sessions to establish which parish was responsible for a pauper 
whose bed crossed the parish line.89 If parishes sought to escape liability by repeatedly 
litigating what amounted to a settlement, the cases also reveal that they often engaged in 
questionable practices, such as conniving at bigamous marriages to avoid granting 
settlements, or escorting dying paupers to the parish border to pass on the burden.90 
Furthermore, since the magistrates decided by vote, outcomes might not rest on law alone. In 
1817, Robinson argued a case for the parish officers of Carlton, near Newmarket, against an 
appeal against the Poor Rates by the Rector, who argued that he should not be rated for corn 
rents taken in lieu of tithes. The case was lost: ‘there being but one or two laymen on the 
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Bench, no wonder that the Clergyman had the victory.’91 
 
While business at sessions might be very short-term in nature, litigation before the superior 
courts could be much more complex, and occupy more time. As part of his retainer for the 
Duchy of Cornwall, Coleridge was counsel in the case of Rowe v. Brenton. This was a 
complex dispute over Cornish mining rights, and his diary describes how, over several 
months in 1827, Coleridge worked his way through ancient manuscripts at the Duchy office, 
while also advising the King’s  agents on how to secure the Duchy property from future 
encroachments.’92  By the end of the following year, his chambers had become the 
headquarters of a team working twelve hours a day preparing the brief for the trial.93 The 
diary also describes his anxiety at the replacement of James Scarlett as Attorney-General by 
Charles Wetherell, whom he regarded as far inferior; but in the end, the Crown won an easy 
victory (and Coleridge over £500 in fees).94 
 
Given the pressure of business, it is perhaps not surprising that mistakes were often made in 
litigation. Robinson was nonsuited in his first Common Pleas trial in London (an action for 
freight), when three witnesses failed to appear. Only then did he notice that the defendants’ 
plea constituted no defence, and that James Parke (who had drawn the pleadings) should have 
demurred rather than take issue on it.95 In 1817, he was given another difficult hand to play in 
King v. Simms, an action on a covenant by the defendant to pay money in exchange for a 
covenant by the plaintiff to transfer stock.  Robinson realised that he could only succeed in 
his defence if he could show that the covenants were dependent, and despaired of Joseph 
Chitty’s ineptitude in pleading non est factum, instead of demurring for failure to aver a 
willingness to perform. When Robinson attempted ‘laboriously and wretchedly’ to persuade 
the court that the covenants were dependent, Ellenborough ‘became impatient’ and told him 
that he had no time to hear him de omni re scibili, leaving Robinson anxious that he would 
never conquer his ‘disabling fear’ of Ellenborough.96 He also noted his own mistakes. In 
Farrer v. Billing, he won when the court ‘looked over the local act with more sharpness than 
I had done and found out clauses in my favor which I had overlooked’.97 In another case, he 
blundered by forgetting an obvious clause in the Statute of Frauds. He felt no moral qualms - 
thinking his client’s defence was unprincipled - but worried that he had exposed his 
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ignorance to the attorneys.98 Robinson was also thankful to be helped out by kindly judges. 
During one replevin case, where the complex pleas had been badly drawn, he ‘felt so 
thoroughly in a maze that had I been left to myself the cause must have been lost’. After 
Chief Justice Best stepped in and explained the matter to the jury, Robinson noted, ‘For such 
as me Best is an excellent judge – He will not do as Gazelee has done, suffer a case to be 
decided contrary to justice, because the Counsel did not perceive the points in the case.’99 
 
The diaries also give insight into informal advice given by lawyers to broker settlements. In 
1814, Robinson received an unexpected brief to defend D.W. Harvey (who would later gain 
notoriety when rejected by the Benchers of the Inner Temple for a call to the bar) in an action 
for trespass. The worse for drink, Harvey had boorishly forced his way onto the plaintiff 
Merest’s land when refused permission to hunt there. Robinson tried to persuade the jury that 
in a civil action they should only give such damages as reflected the actual injury to the 
plaintiff. However, after Heath J instructed them to give damages for the insult, they returned 
a verdict of £500 damages – the sum laid in the declaration. Over dinner, Heath told 
Robinson that the jury would have found whatever sum the pleader had inserted, and 
everyone agreed the verdict would be set aside.100 However, on the following Wednesday, 
Robinson went to see Merest confidentially – and without consulting Harvey – and suggested 
that for the sake of his own honour, he should propose that Harvey should give £50 to some 
charity, and not enforce the judgment. Although Merest said he would think about it, he did 
not follow Robinson’s advice; and when the case came to the Common Pleas on a motion for 
a new trial, the court upheld the verdict, Justice Heath now saying that ‘he recollected £500 
being given for knocking a hat off a man’s head’.101 This was not the only time when Heath’s 
inconsistencies made Robinson marvel at ‘the glorious uncertainty of the Law’.102 
 
The dairies also offer us novel insights into two aspects of barristers’ work, which were 
central to civil litigation. The first concerns writs of inquiry.103 When cases in which 
judgment had gone by default were sent to sheriffs’ juries to assess damages, the parties were 
entitled to be represented by counsel. In such hearings, the jury did not simply hear evidence 
relating to the extent of damage suffered, but also heard evidence relating to the cause of 
action. Robinson appeared in many such hearings, and his diaries reveal the process to be 
very like the kind of trial heard at nisi prius. For instance, in February 1817, he attended on a 
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writ of inquiry at the Sheriff’s Office in Bedford Row, in an action of negligence in the use of 
a hired horse. Rather than simply assessing how much the horse had been damaged by 
admitted negligence, counsel at the hearing disputed whether there had been any negligence 
which had damaged the horse. For the plaintiff, it was shown that the horse had been returned 
‘in a very bad condition broken winded’ after a week. Robinson made a spirited speech in 
which he attempted to argue that his client had not misused the horse and was not responsible 
for its health, but his witnesses failed to show that it had been broken winded before, and 
could not explain why there was a delay in returning it (which implied there was something 
to hide). In the end, the jury gave a verdict for £40.104 
      
In the same month, in another writ of inquiry in the Secondaries’ Office in Coleman Street, 
Robinson acted for the defendant in a writ of inquiry in Haslam v. Drage, brought for the 
value of shop goods delivered to his wife. Instead of being asked simply to assess damages, 
the jury were invited to consider the liability of the defendant to pay. Robinson explained to 
them that the defendant was a poor shepherd whose son had become a farmer. The goods in 
question had not been ordered by the father, but by his son, who shared the same name. When 
they were delivered to the defendant’s wife, she accepted them as the agent of her son, and 
not as the agent of her husband. Furthermore, it was only after the son’s bankruptcy that his 
the father had been arrested for the debt. Robinson managed to prove his case through the 
testimony of the son, and a verdict of only 1 shilling was given; though he conceded that ‘if 
there had been a Counsel on the other side there might have been a different verdict’.105 He 
won the case by persuading the jury that the defendant had no legal liability to pay, even 
though this was precisely the point apparently conceded by the default judgment.  
 
Barristers also spent much time conducting arbitrations, or appearing before them. In many 
instances, cases were referred to barristers simply because of pressure of time at the 
assizes.106 Other reasons to refer to arbitration might be the complexity of the issues 
involved107 or questions of confidentiality, whether personal108 or commercial.109 A reference 
might also provide the kind of flexible, equitable solution which a common law jury was 
unable to provide, as where parties disputed rights to water.110 One example of the latter was 
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Winter v. Lethbridge. The reference required Coleridge to settle all matters in dispute 
between the parties relating to a stream which flowed through both parties’ lands and to 
regulate its future use. Coleridge’s diary makes it evident that this case was not referred to 
him because the parties wished to have their case settled by ‘love’ rather than ‘law’. For this 
was ‘one of nearly a hundred quarrels between the two men and their respective fathers’, 
concerning rights to land which intersected. Indeed, at the very time that Coleridge was 
conducting his arbitration, the parties were litigating another dispute relating to their property 
at the Somerset summer assizes.111 He wrote, ‘there is so much jealousy on both sides [that] it 
has been impossible for me to preclude any course of inquiry that either party thought 
material.’112 Coleridge clearly did not enjoy the task: before resuming his hearings in 
September, he noted, ‘it will be no very pleasant way of spending my time to have little 
Williams and Jeremy [the counsel on both sides] squabbling all day before me’.113 
Eventually, Coleridge’s award set out how the stream was to be managed to give both parties 
a reasonable supply. Though he thought the parties were satisfied by his performance, the 
litigation did not end with the award, for the following spring Winter moved (unsuccessfully) 
to set it aside, on the ground that Coleridge had exceeded his jurisdiction.114 
 
The fact that a reference to arbitration did not close off the continuation of litigation can also 
be seen in the 1826 case of Cubitt v. Porter, in which Robinson acted for the defendants. This 
was an action to try the right to a wall, which his clients had extended. When Best CJ referred 
the case to arbitration,115 he directed that the cottages which had been built by the defendant 
on the wall should not be pulled down (in case the finding went against him), but that 
compensation should be given. Before the arbitration commenced, the arbitrator, Andrews, 
required the plaintiff’s landlord to be a party, so that he could also be bound by the decision. 
This was objected to by the plaintiff, whose counsel Fitzroy Kelly advised the landlord only 
to consent on condition that if the arbitrator found for the defendant, he would direct a 
nonsuit, so that the landlord would not be bound. This was unacceptable to the defendant and 
the arbitration stalled. When Robinson later sought to make the plaintiffs pay the costs of the 
reference, he lost, after Bayley J took the ‘strange view’ that Best CJ had meant that the 
tenant was to receive compensation if the wall was found to belong to the landlord, but that 
the landlord was not to be bound in an action of trespass.116 In this case, the reference to 
arbitration was regarded by one of the parties as only a step in a continuing litigation strategy, 
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which took the parties back to court.         
 
Court-directed arbitrations were conducted before lawyers by lawyers, who sometimes came 
in gown and wig.117 Some cases – such as Oliver v. Lucas, a dispute over the payment due 
from a landlord to a tenant for crops – were conducted very much like trials, save in being 
held after hours at the lodgings of the arbitrator.118 Other cases might have a broader 
chronological and geographical span. In Hurrell v. Underwood, an action for digging a sluice 
which had flooded the plaintiff’s mill, the arbitration was held at Bassington, near the site at 
issue, and stretched over several months. While both sides sought to make their cases out by 
the evidence of witnesses, including surveyors, the defendant also sought to give a practical 
demonstration of the limited impact of his sluice by opening it, in the presence of all the 
parties. This demonstration did not settle the matter, however, since there was a dispute over 
whether Underwood had declared in public that he would flood the land, which he denied 
before the arbitrator.119  
 
If references to arbitration often mimicked court proceedings, the strict rules of court which 
excluded party evidence did not apply here.120 Nonetheless, questions of the admissibility or 
probative value of evidence could be raised at arbitrations, just as at trial. In 1818, Robinson 
was counsel in an arbitration in the case of Weldon v. Ind, where the plaintiffs had sought an 
account from an executor. The dispute had already led the parties into the Chancery,121 but 
was referred to an arbitration before Trower, which came to be conducted in a number of 
London coffee houses in the first half of the year. During the course of the arbitration, 
counsel and arbitrator disagreed over the rules of evidence. The only evidence which the 
plaintiffs had for their claim was a note of hand given to them, together with accounts in the 
hand of the testator. Trower held that the accounts could only be evidence against the 
claimants: that is, they could be used to show what money had been paid out by the 
executors, but not as evidence of what remained to be paid – a ‘monstrous absurdity’ 
according to Robinson. ‘He confounding these accounts considered as Evidence with the 
allegations of a party in an Answer,’ Robinson noted: ‘in the latter case what a man admits is 
taken against him, and what he asserts in avoidance of his admission is still to be proved – 
But when accounts like these are taken as Evidence by a party he makes both sides 
Evidence.’122 The matter continued to be disputed between Trower and Robinson (who 
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invoked the assistance of his friends Basil Montague and James Stephen),123 though in the 
end this issue did not need to be resolved, since the ‘troublesome’ case was compromised.124 
 
Arbitrators sometimes had to decide what were in essence legal questions. For instance, 
Serjeant Frere was arbitrator in the case of Skrimshire v. Dover, concerning an overreaching 
bargain: the plaintiff had let the tithes of his vicarage at considerable undervalue, but since he 
had never resided in the vicarage, he claimed to be able to void the lease by virtue of an old 
statute. This raised a question of law: ‘whether the lease be good by retrospection, the Statute 
of 43rd of Geo: 3rd having repealed the old statute.’ This turned out to be a knotty legal point 
which Robinson and Alderson argued until half past one in the morning.125 At other times, 
the questions were largely factual, and required the arbitrator to weigh conflicting evidence. 
This could also be challenging. Faced with the directly contradictory evidence of ‘two 
religious professors’ in the case of Wilcox v. Borsley, arbitrator Robinson wrote, ‘Whom am I 
to believe? I can but guess after all and do as juries must often do, take probabilities into my 
consideration and decide because there must be a decision, not because I know with whom 
the justice lies.’126 However, unlike judges at common law, arbitrators could attach 
conditions to their awards, with proceedings on an award in one party’s favour being stayed if 
the other party performed certain stipulated acts.127 
 
Conclusion  
 
If these diaries give us a fascinating glimpse into the day-to-day lives of practising lawyers, 
their struggles to maintain an income and secure preferment in the great competition of the 
profession, they also offer some important insights into the nature of legal practice. In 
particular, they shed new light on some aspects of legal practice which have not as yet 
received the level of attention accorded to the Superior Courts. They show not only the 
centrality to the lives of many young lawyers of the ‘public law’ litigation which made up so 
much of the business of Quarter Sessions, revealing the nature and quality of legal arguments 
in that forum, but also how doctrinal legal argument found its way into inquiries before 
sheriffs and into arbitrations before barristers. In this way, they can enrich our understanding 
of the nature of legal culture in a number of under-explored legal forums. They also show the 
practical challenges faced by lawyers conducting litigation and the strategies that they 
employed on behalf of their clients. 
 
More broadly, the insights they give into the mind of the lawyer dealing with day-to-day 
issues underscore the point, long argued by doctrinal legal historians, that the common law’s 
development often owed more to trial and error in forensic argumentation as lawyers strove 
to achieve the best results for their clients than to any systematic vision of doctrine held by 
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learned lawyers.128 For the diaries tell a story of men who had no great vision of law - and 
often a limited appetite for the niceties of doctrine - and who often learned on the job, as they 
strove to win whatever cases had by chance come their way. Forensic ingenuity might have 
laid the foundations for significant new doctrinal developments, but these would need to be 
honed and refined over time through repeated litigation, and ex post facto reflection. 
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